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Pessimism over pension prospect is widely spread among Japanese nationals. A recent survey reveals 
that roughly 70% Japanese feel anxious about the reliability of the public pension system.  Despite most 
Japanese anticipate a cut of pension benefi t in the future, the anticipated range of cut varies notably from 
person to person. Some are extremely pessimistic about pension prospect, others less so. On average, 
Japanese nationals are much more pessimistic than policy makers.  To cope with the future benefi t cut, 
households is likely to spend less and accumulate wealth.
The elderly are major owners of Japan’s huge household wealth.  Elderly households whose head aged 
60 or over, were estimated to hold a total of 358.8 trillion yen in net fi nancial wealth in 2004, which is 
equal to nearly one year of Japan’s GDP??. Elderly households own 51.4 percent of housing and land 
assets, and 78.6 percent of net fi nancial wealth, despite that they account for only 37.4 percent of the 
overall households??. Contrary to the prediction of simple life-cycle model, most Japanese elderly 
households keep accumulating wealth even in the very late life stage. An average elderly household with 
workers’ head saves nearly 10 percent of their disposable income each year. 
Here, a simple question arises: do Japanese elderly households save excessively and accumulate too 
much wealth? Dekle (1990) believes that the answer is “yes”. Using a 1983 Japanese household survey, 
Dekle (1990) fi nds an obvious absence of dissaving among Japanese elderly households, based on there 
being no signifi cant differences in total wealth between different age groups for Japanese elderly 
1? The total gross fi nancial wealth of Japanese households was estimated to be as much as 1,410.4 trillion yen in 2009 
(Source: Bank of Japan ?Statistics of Flow-of-Fund Account?).
2? The number of 358.8 trillion yen and the percentages are computed by the authors basing on the statistics of Table 2.
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households. A recent simulation study by Uemura (2008) suggests that Japanese elderly households have 
around 179 trillion yen of excessive savings, compared with the predicted amount based on a typical 
life-cycle model.
There are at least three potential reasons for elderly households to save excessively -  (1) precautionary 
motive against lifespan uncertainties, (2) strategic motive that use wealth inheritance to entice attention 
from their children, and (3) bequest motive due to the altruism toward their children or to the 
perpetuation of family line and/or the family business.  Among them, the precautionary motive is of 
special importance (Zhou 2003, Horioka 2002).  If the insurance markets (i.e. annuity, medical care, 
disaster) function perfectly, the lifespan uncertainty will be reduced to nearly zero and elderly will have 
little need to hold excessive wealth for precaution.  In fact, however, the insurance markets are imperfect. 
Particularly, when the anxiety toward the sustainability of the public pension system surges among 
Japanese households. As we will explain in Section 2, public pension uncertainty is very likely to be 
responsible for the precautionary savings and excessive wealth accumulation by elderly households. The 
essential question is as follows: how much precautionary saving results from public pension uncertainty? 
Answers to this puzzle will be critical for the evaluation of the Democratic Party’s social security 
expansion policy and for the development of future growth strategies. Nevertheless, very few empirical 
studies have been conducted on this topic.
The present paper therefore uses a unique survey conducted by the Japan Institute for Labour Policy 
and Training (JILPT) in 2009 to tackle this problem. An important contribution of the JILPT survey is 
the provision of data on public pension uncertainty: the anticipated percentage change (APC) in public 
pension benefi ts with respect to the present benefi t level, and the ideal amount (IA) of public pension for 
retirement. These data enable us to construct two indexes of public pension uncertainty: anticipated 
change rate in public pension benefi ts, and the expected change in the value of public pension benefi ts 
(APC×IA). Additionally, to assess precautionary savings motives more precisely, we limit our samples to 
people close to retirement for whom the labor income risk should be relatively small, following Lusardi 
(1997). Our estimates indicate that public pension uncertainty affects household wealth accumulation 
signifi cantly, and that precautionary savings make up nearly 10 percent of net and 5 percent of gross 
fi nancial wealth accumulation by close-to-retirement households.
?????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????
The most recent Japanese net household saving rate (national accounting base) has slid to a historical 
low of 3.2 percent in 2006, from 11.4 percent in 1997. Along with population aging and capital 
depreciation, the net household saving rate may reach as low as zero or even become negative in the 
long run (NIRA 2008). Accordingly, perception of Japanese household saving behavior has changed 
notably. Horioka (2004) compares net household saving rates between Japan and 13 other OECD 
countries and fi nds that Japan has not had the highest saving rate since the mid 1980s. He thus concludes 
that Japan may no longer be regarded as the nation of enthusiastic savers it once was.
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However, in examining the saving behavior of each household, we get a different image. The gross 
saving rate (also named “surplus ratio”) of the workers’ households has been as high as 25–30 percent in 
the 2000s (see Table 1). Even retirement-age households, with heads-of-household aged 60 or over, save 
nearly 10 percent of their disposable income each year. Meanwhile, Japanese households’ wealth 
accumulation remains among the highest of OECD countries. According to OECD statistics for 2006, 
the ratio of household net fi nancial wealth to disposable income is 403.7 percent in Japan, which is 
notably higher than in the US (309.1 percent), Britain (291.3 percent), Germany (198.3 percent), and 
other OECD countries.
Hence, a simple question arises: do Japanese households save excessively and accumulate too much 
wealth? Dekle (1990) believes the answer is yes, at least for elderly households. Using a 1983 Japanese 
household survey, Dekle (1990) finds an obvious absence of dissaving among Japanese elderly 
households, based on there being no signifi cant differences in total wealth between different age groups 
for Japanese elderly households. A recent simulation study by Uemura (2008) suggests that Japanese 
elderly households have around 179 trillion yen of excessive savings, compared with the predicted 
amount based on a typical life-cycle model. Japanese households were estimated to hold a total of 456.9 
trillion yen in net fi nancial wealth in 2004, which is equal to nearly one year of GDP?? in Japan (see 
Table 2). Elderly households, however, are the major holders of this huge stock of fi nancial wealth: 
households with heads-of-household aged 60 or over own 78.6 percent of the total net fi nancial wealth, 
while their population share is only 37.4 percent.
??????????????????????????????????????
Recently, increasing concern about the sustainability of the public pension system has made this a 
more important uncertainty factor for Japanese households. According to the Social Security Survey 
conducted by the Japan Institute of Life Insurance (Seimei Hoken Bunka Center) in 2007, 69.2 percent 
3? The total gross fi nancial wealth of Japanese households was estimated to be as much as 1,410.4 trillion yen in 2009 
(Source: Bank of Japan ?Statistics of Flow-of-Fund Account?).
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of respondents feel somewhat anxious about life in retirement because they believe that the public 
pension cannot provide a reliable retirement income, which is 10.2 percentage points higher than the 
1998 survey. Accordingly, the saving motive for living expenses during old age (namely “retirement 
saving”) seems to be stronger. 
A long-lasting annual survey by the Central Council for Financial Services Information shows that the 
saving motive for living expenses during old age has been sharply gaining weight since 1985, the year 
that Japan enacted signifi cant reforms of its public pension system. Figure 1 shows the proportion of 
respondents that admitted having a saving motive for living expenses during old age. The retirement 
saving motive fl uctuated around 30–40 percent before 1985; it then rose steadily thereafter, with an 
accelerated speed after the crash of the bubble economy in 1992 and after the scandal of the missing 
pension records in 2007. In 2009, 61.6 percent of Japanese reported that they were saving for retirement, 
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almost a 20-percentage-point increase from 42.5 percent in 1985.
 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Japan’s public pension system is a two-tiered system in which the fi rst tier (namely, the “basic 
pension”) is common for all nationals while the second tier is divided into three parts according to the 
occupation of the insurees: the Employees’ Pension System to which private salaried workers belong, the 
Mutual Aid Association Pension System to which government workers belong, and the National Pension 
System?? to which the self-employed and all others belong. All of these public pension systems are 
essentially operated on a pay-as-you-go basis. Thus, in a society in which fertility is declining and the 
population is aging, it becomes necessary to raise the contribution rate or cut the benefi ts of pensioners 
in order to keep a balanced budget.
Japan’s population is known to be aging at its fastest rate in human history (Horioka et al. 2007). In 
2008, the ratio of the productive-age (15–64 years) population to the elderly (65 and over) population 
reached 33.6 percent, which implies that it takes three productive-age people to support one elderly 
person. This ratio is projected to reach 50.2 percent in 2023 and 85.7 percent at the age peak of 2072. 
Besides this rapid aging process, the stagnation of economic growth in the past two decades has 
worsened the fi scal situation of the public pension system.
Because of the signifi cant political power of the elderly population, until the 1994 reform, the public 
pension budget was balanced mainly by increasing the contribution rate. The benefi ts of pensioners were 
protected, and few retirees felt any anxiety over their pension benefi ts. Raising the contribution rate 
repeatedly as a budget balancing mechanism, of course, imposed heavy burdens on working households 
and resulted in further distrust of the public pension system among young generations. Accordingly, the 
number of dropouts and premium defaulters within the National Pension System has increased sharply 
since the 1990s (Suzuki and Zhou 2010). In 2008, the default rate for the national pension premium 
reached as high as 37.9 percent.
In the 1994 pension reform (and reforms thereafter), the Japanese government had no choice but to 
begin cutting the benefi ts of pensioners step by step. Firstly, in the 1994 reform, the eligible age for the 
basic pension benefi t was postponed from 60 to 65 years in a phased manner. Then in the 1999 reform, 
the eligible age for the second-tier benefi t was changed from 60 to 65 in a phased manner. The 1999 
reform reduced pensioner benefi ts by 20 percent in incremental steps. The 2004 reform introduced a new 
system named “Macro Economic Slide” (MES), whereby the benefi t amount of pensioners was lowered 
automatically along with the declining birth rate and the increasing longevity of the elderly??. According 
to simulations by the Japanese government, no further benefi t reductions or eligible age postponing will 
be necessary until 2023 if the MES functions well. However, because the peak of population aging will 
4? The maximum benefi t level for the ?basic pension? is 66,000 yen per month. Pensioners belonging to the National 
Pension System are eligible for the ?basic pension? only, while pensioners belonging to the other two systems are 
eligible for a second-tier benefi t proportional to his/her total earnings for their working lifetime.
5? The public pension system was regulated by law to be reformed once every fi ve years, based on forecasts of the 
future fi nancial situation of the system. After the introduction of MES in 2004, however, this ?once every fi ve years 
reform? is regarded as unnecessary, and it was deleted from law.
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occur in 2075, the risk of further cuts in pension benefi ts will be very high over the longer term.
In summary, for most Japanese households, including the close-to-retirement households, public 
pension uncertainty arises from not only the existing MES but also the unavoidable future reforms. As 
Horioka (1990) warned, uncertainty in the future provisions of the Japanese public pension system will 
cause Japanese households to discount future benefi ts heavily and to save excessively.
?????????????????????
The idea that people engage in saving as protection against income risk represents an important 
innovation in the life-cycle permanent-income hypothesis in explaining excessive household saving and 
wealth accumulation. Many empirical studies have been performed to evaluate the importance and 
magnitude of precautionary saving, but so far the fi ndings are inconclusive. As Lusardi (1997) stresses, 
one of the major problems of empirical work is how to construct an exogenous direct index of income 
risk. Some studies (e.g. Skinner 1998) use occupation as a proxy for income risk, but this is criticized for 
selectivity bias, because people may choose occupations depending upon their degree of risk aversion. 
Other studies (e.g. Guiso et al. 1992; Lusardi 1997, 1998) utilize households’ expectations about the 
probability of unemployment or nominal earnings changes as a proxy for income risk. These studies may 
suffer from measurement error, because the self-reported earnings variance refers to one-period-ahead 
forecasts of income and cannot be interpreted as a measure of lifetime earnings variance. Other studies 
using income variance within homogeneous groups (e.g. Dardanoni 1991; Carroll and Samwick 1998) as 
a proxy for income risk. However, this measure of income risk is not appropriate unless the income 
variability of households within each group is homogenous enough and the income variance varies 
signifi cantly across different groups.
As a whole, empirical studies that use occupation or subject earnings variance as a proxy for income 
risk fi nd little evidence in favor of the precautionary saving model. For example, Skinner (1998) 
compares the saving rates across different occupations and fi nds that people in riskier occupations, such 
as farmers or the self-employed, are in fact saving less than are people in professions with less income 
variability. Guiso et al. (1992) and Lusardi (1997) both employ households’ expected nominal earnings 
changes as a measure of income risk from the 1989 Italian SHIW. They fi nd that precautionary savings 
explain only 2–2.8 percent of total wealth accumulation. Additionally, Lusardi (1998) constructs an 
income risk index by using information about the subjective probability of job loss from the Health and 
Retirement Survey. He then fi nds that although precautionary saving has a role in explaining excessive 
saving and wealth accumulation by people close to retirement, it explains only a small part (2–4.5 
percent of net fi nancial wealth) of total wealth accumulation.
On the other hand, empirical studies using the variance of the income of homogeneous groups as a 
measure of income risk have in general obtained results supportive of the precautionary saving model. 
For instance, Carroll and Samwick (1998) divide the Panel.
Study of Income Dynamics sample into 26 groups according to the occupation, industry, and 
education of the head-of-household, with the variance and log of the income within each group 
employed as proxies for income uncertainty. As a result, they fi nd that wealth and uncertainty are 
positively related, and that precautionary savings account for 45 percent of total net worth and 32 percent 
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of very-liquid assets for households with heads-of-household aged younger than 50 years. Using cross-
section data for Britain, Dardanoni (1991) estimates income variances by grouping the sample into 
dozens of groups with respect to the industry, economic position, and skill level of the head-of-
household. His estimates indicate that more than 60 percent of savings arise as a precaution against 
future risk. Furthermore, Kazarosian (1997) decomposes individual-specifi c income uncertainty into 
permanent and transitory components using National Longitudinal Survey He fi nds that the impact of 
uncertainty on the ratio of wealth to permanent income is highly signifi cant, and that a doubling of 
uncertainty increases the ratio of wealth to permanent income by 29 percent.
Empirical studies of Japanese precautionary saving, although still limited, have become more common 
since the 2000s. Zhou (2003) improves upon the methodology of Dardanoni (1991) and applies it to 
Japanese household-level data. Specifi cally, she divides a representative Japanese sample into 56 
homogeneous groups with respect to the education, age, and occupation of the head-of-household, and 
regards the income variances within each group as proxies for income risk for each household in that 
group. Zhou (2003) fi nds that precautionary saving represents 5.6 percent of the total savings of salaried-
worker households and 64.3 percent of the total savings of farmers and self-employed households. 
Bessho and Tobita (2008) quote job loss rates and standard deviations of income by gender, age, 
education, and marital status from macro statistics, and then match this information with Japanese 
household-level data to obtain proxies for income uncertainty. They fi nd that uncertainty is positively 
related to the wealth-to-income ratio, and that precautionary savings account for 6–15 percent of 
household net fi nancial assets.
Many recent empirical studies shed light upon the effect of uncertainties in the social security system 
on household saving. The uncertainty of medical expenses, however, is one of the hottest topics. Using 
data from the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances, Starr-McCluer (1996) finds that, contrary to 
expectations, insured households maintain a much higher level of wealth than comparable households 
without insurance. She concludes that savings and health insurance are related for reasons that have little 
to do with certainty and precautionary motives. In contrast, Chou et al. (2003) fi nd supportive evidence 
for the hypothesis of precautionary saving for medical expenses uncertainty. Using a natural experiment 
associated with the 1995 introduction of the National Health Insurance program in Taiwan, they fi nd that 
the program reduced Taiwanese households’ savings by an average of 8.6–13.7 percent, with the largest 
effects for households with the least savings. Additionally, Palumbo (1999) uses a health-uncertainty 
model to predict household consumption expenditures, and his simulations imply that uncertain future 
out-of-pocket medical expenses reduce household annual consumption among elderly American couples 
by 7 percent.
There have been very few empirical studies of precautionary saving with respect to social security 
uncertainty in Japan, with the exception of Suzuki et al. (2008) and Murata (2003). Using Japanese 
micro data, Suzuki et al. (2008) examine whether the introduction of the Japanese Long-term Care 
Insurance System in 2000 has reduced households’ precautionary saving or not. Contrary to their 
expectations, they fi nd that households’ gross fi nancial assets remain constant or even slightly higher 
among elderly households. As Suzuki et al. (2008) admit in their paper, the uncertainty reduction effect 
of the Long-term Care Insurance System might be cancelled out by other social changes (e.g. a sharp 
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increase in public pension uncertainty, a rise in the unemployment rate, etc.).
On the other hand, Murata (2003) uses information about households’ attitudes toward the public 
pension system?? from a Japanese household survey to proxy public pension uncertainty. Although the 
fi nal result is inconclusive, she fi nds supportive evidence for the precautionary saving model when 
limiting the sample to households where grown-up children do not coreside with their parents. That is, 
households besides coresidences with higher levels of anxiety toward the public pension system have a 
higher wealth-to-income ratio than comparable households that feel comfortable with the present pension 
system. Given that the average fi nancial assets holdings of households with some anxiety about the 
pension system are 2.1 million yen higher than their counterparts’, Murata (2003) suggests that 
precautionary saving because of public pension uncertainty could account for 1/4 to 1/3 of household 
fi nancial wealth.
The present paper focuses on the impact of public pension uncertainty on household wealth 
accumulation, but it improves upon Murata’s (2003) approach in the following ways. First, we use more 
specifi c and quantitative measures for public pension uncertainty instead of the abstract, four-choice 
dummy variable used in Murata (2003). Second, we limit our sample to people close to retirement, for 
whom labor income risk should be relatively small and public pension uncertainty should be relatively 
dominant, while Murata’s sample is young households with members aged 27–37 years, for whom 
saving for child-rearing and housing are so prominent that it is diffi cult to save for public pension 
uncertainty. Third, we use econometric simulation techniques to estimate the precise magnitude of 
precautionary saving because of pension uncertainty instead of depending on descriptive statistics for 
approximate estimates. 
????????????????????????????
????????
This study uses household data from the Survey on the Employment and Work Conditions of Elderly 
People (SEWCEP), a survey that was conducted by the Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training in 
2008. To ensure that the sample was representative of the Japanese population, the sample was selected 
from the Basic Residential Registers (“Jyumin Kihon Daicho”), based on a two-stage stratifi ed sampling 
procedure. To improve the response rate, the questionnaires were distributed by surveyors instead of 
mailing. Surveyors distributed and explained the questionnaire to subjects in person, and several days 
later, the surveyors visited the subjects again to collect the questionnaires. Five thousand individuals 
aged between 55 and 69 years received the questionnaire throughout Japan, of whom 3,602 responded. 
The response rate was 72.0 percent.
Because of the necessity of estimating permanent income and the need to limit our sample to the 
close-to-retirement households, we used subjects (N=1,012) that met the following three conditions: (1) 
presently working and earning some labor income, (2) not yet receiving any public pension benefi t, and 
6? The variable is discontinuous and includes four choices: very comfortable, anxious about benefi t cuts, anxious about 
the sustainability of the system, and no plan to rely on the system.
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(3) head of the household??. We took the predicted labor income of the head-of-household from his/her 
income function as a proxy for his/her permanent income. (See Appendix I for details.)
The SEWCEP collected very detailed data on retirement plans, pension participation, household 
holdings of fi nancial assets and debts, and consumption. Most interestingly, the SEWCEP provides 
unique information that can be used to construct proxies for public pension uncertainty.
????????????????????????????????????????
SEWCEP includes data on the anticipated percentage change (APC) in public pension benefi ts with 
respect to the present benefi t level. The anticipated percentage change is determined in two steps: fi rst, 
the respondents are asked to predict whether they think that their own public pension benefi t will (a) rise, 
(b) drop, or (c) remain unchanged/unknown compared with the present benefi t level??. Then, those who 
responded (a) or (b) are requested to provide the specifi c percentage (m percent) change that they expect. 
We take the APC as 0 percent for “(c) remain unchanged/unknown” cases, –m percent for “(b) drop” 
cases, and +m percent for “(a) rise” cases.
Our second candidate measure of public pension uncertainty is the anticipated value change (AVC) of 
the public pension, which equals APC multiplied by the ideal amount (IA) of the public pension for 
retirement. IA, however, is constructed by multiplying the ideal amount of living expenses in retirement 
by the ideal fi nancing rate of the public pension benefi t??.
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The distribution of the anticipated change in the public pension in terms of both percentage change 
and value change is shown in Figure 2. Although nearly half of the respondents expect “remain 
7? Because there is no direct information in the survey to determine whether a respondent is a head-of-household, we 
treat subjects that meet any of the following two conditions as a household head: (1) total income (including unearned 
income) of the respondent accounts for 50 percent or more of household income; (2) the biggest component of total 
income for the household is the respondent?s labor income.
8? Refl ecting the recent trend of pension reforms, only 1.4 percent of respondents expected a rise in pension benefi ts, 
and 43.8 percent of respondents expected a drop.
9? The ideal living expenses cover both the respondent and his/her spouse (if they have one).
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unchanged/unknown”, the percentage of respondents (43.8 percent) expecting a drop is much larger than 
those expecting a rise (1.4 percent). The average anticipated percentage change is –9.3 percent, and the 
average anticipated value change is –21.9 thousand yen (see Table 3). In comparison with the 
government’s presently planned pension percentage change (–4.8 percent) and value change (–11.7 
thousand yen)???, households’ anticipated decline in pension benefi ts is much larger. This huge gap 
between households’ anticipation and the government’s planning refl ects the fact that households are 
discounting future pension benefi ts much more heavily than the government’s planned level. This 
household pessimism toward public pensions is very likely to induce households to practice excessive 
saving and wealth accumulation.
?????????????????????
Three measures of wealth are used in our empirical analysis. The fi rst measure (gross fi nancial assets) 
is defi ned as the sum of all savings account balances???. The second measure (net fi nancial assets 1) is 
calculated by deducting all debts from gross fi nancial assets. The third measure (net fi nancial assets 2) is 
computed by deducting all debts, except housing mortgages, from gross fi nancial assets. Because most 
households with a mortgage should possess a comparable or higher value of housing assets than average, 
the third measure sounds more reasonable as an index of households’ net fi nancial assets.
Because the wealth-to-income ratio has such a wide distribution, and outliers can signifi cantly affect 
the estimates, we trimmed the distribution and excluded the top and bottom 2.5 percent. For the close-to-
retirement households, the average wealth-to-income ratio is 163 percent according to the fi rst measure, 
50 percent according to the second measure, and 124 percent according to the third measure (see Table 
3).
Because the SEWCEP contains no data on the specifi c values of housing assets or other real assets, we 
could not compute total household worth or net worth. As an alternative, we included an own-house 
dummy as an explanatory variable in our estimations, to control for the effect of real assets.
???????????????????
The theoretical predictions of the precautionary saving model can be summarized with reference to 
the following reduced-form equation, which has been employed by many empirical studies (e.g. 
Kazarosian 1997; Lusardi 1998; Murata 2003).
P
h
h ?a? AGE?a?Uh?Xh' β?εhY
W
? (1)
In the above model, a0, a1,?β are coeffi cients, and ε is a normally distributed disturbance term. Wealth 
divided by the permanent income (W/Y?p) of household h is a function of AGE, household characteristics 
(X) that refl ect the preferences parameters, and uncertainty about future income (U). Uncertainty about 
future income, in this paper’s context, is uncertainty about public pension benefi ts, because our sample is 
10? Both are simulation values computed by the authors. See Appendix II for details of the simulation.
11? Because it is rare for Japanese household to hold bonds, stocks, and individual retirement annuities, saving accounts 
represent a major type of household fi nancial assets.
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limited to close-to-retirement households. A supportive condition of the precautionary saving model is 
that uncertainty is positively related to the wealth-to-income ratio. In our context, because the values of 
our uncertainty proxies are inversely proportional to the degree of uncertainty, the estimated coeffi cient 
should be negative (â1?0) if the precautionary saving model is true.
As King and Dicks-Mireaux (1982) note, when preferences are nonhomothetic, X may include 
permanent income???. Specifically, X is a vector of the following variables: gender, four-scaled 
educational attainment, four-scaled health condition, marital status, having a family member in need of 
nursing care or not, having double income or not, coresiding with parents or not, number of family 
members, children’s status??? and residence (fi ve-scaled city size and 11 districts). Including children’s 
status in the estimations enables us to test the hypothesis of a bequest motive. The descriptive statistics 
of the major variables are presented in Table 3.
?????????????????????
Table 4 presents the correlation coeffi cients between the wealth-to-income ratio and public pension 
uncertainty. No matter what measures are used, the correlation coeffi cients are all negative, just as the 
precautionary saving model predicts. However, the relationship between the wealth-to-income ratio and 
pension uncertainty seems to be quite weak with respect to the magnitude of the coeffi cients (less than 
–0.2).
When controlling for the other covariates, however, the estimation results show more supportive 
evidence for the precautionary saving model. Table 5 presents estimates of the wealth-to-income 
equation by using the APC as a proxy for uncertainty. Table 6, however, uses the alternative proxy, AVC. 
Both tables present estimation results when either gross fi nancial assets, net fi nancial assets 1, or net 
fi nancial assets 2 are used as the measure of wealth.
In accordance with the precautionary saving model, the sign of pension uncertainty is negative and 
statistically signifi cant in fi ve of the six cases, indicating that when people feel greater uncertainty about 
the public pension, they will save more and accumulate more wealth.
Table 7 presents our estimate of the magnitude of precautionary saving for public pension uncertainty 
by calculating what our results imply about the share of precautionary wealth in total wealth 
accumulation. We can calculate the share of precautionary saving (λ) in total wealth (W) from a1, the 
estimated coeffi cient of σ, as follows:
P
? ?W
W
PW PPY
W
/
PY/
? ?
OD?a?
W PY/
λ  (2)
12? Some studies (e.g. Lusardi 1997; Bessho and Tobita 2008) assume homothetic preferences and use the log of W/Y?P as 
the dependent variable. In that case, all the observations with negative net wealth will be automatically excluded from 
the sample. Because negative net fi nancial assets are quite common in real life, we use absolute value instead of the 
log value of W/Y P as the dependent variable.
13? Children?s status is defi ned as either one of the following three conditions: a) no child, b) all children independent, 
and c) not all children independent.
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Here, PW  is the average precautionary wealth accumulation against public pension uncertainty. OD is 
the over-discounting of future pension benefi ts, defi ned as the difference between households’ anticipated 
percentage change (or value change) of the pension benefi t and the government’s planned percentage 
change (or value change). λ is predicted to be 9.87–9.91 percent when net fi nancial assets 2 are 
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employed as the wealth index, which means that precautionary saving accounts for about 10 percent of 
the net fi nancial assets of close-to-retirement households (see Table 7). λ is predicted to be 5.46–5.78 
percent or 20.32–28.07 percent when either gross fi nancial assets or net fi nancial assets 1, respectively, 
are used as the index of wealth.
Precaution against future public pension uncertainty may not be the sole incentive for excessive 
wealth accumulation. The elderly may also be holding excessive wealth for the bequest motive (Dekle 
1990). The estimation results in Tables 5 and 6, however, provide little supportive evidence for the 
bequest motive hypothesis. Wealth holding by households is not changed signifi cantly by the existence 
of children. Rather, households with economically independent children have a signifi cantly lower 
wealth-to-income ratio in comparison with the households without children.
Estimates of household characteristics are in general consistent with intuition. For example, 
households headed by a female or a more highly educated individual, households that own their 
residences, and households with fewer family members have a relatively higher wealth-to-income ratio 
than their counterparts.
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??????????????????????
Using a representative and unique Japanese elderly household survey, this paper investigated the 
impact of public pension uncertainty on wealth accumulation by close-to-retirement Japanese 
households. Households’ anticipated percentage/value changes in pension and future public pension 
benefi ts with respect to the present benefi t level were used to proxy pension uncertainty. Our principle 
econometric fi nding is that households’ fi nancial wealth holdings are positively and signifi cantly related 
to public pension uncertainty for various measures of wealth and both uncertainty proxies.
We also found that households discount future pension benefits much more heavily than the 
government’s planned pension cut. We use this discrepancy as an index of households’ over-discounting 
rate on future pension benefi ts and combine this information with the estimation result to predict the 
magnitude of precautionary saving. Our simulations suggest that approximately 10 percent of net 
fi nancial assets and 5 percent of gross fi nancial assets of the close-to-retirement households are held as a 
precaution against public pension uncertainty. Hence, our findings are in accordance with the 
precautionary saving model and provide supportive evidence for the hypothesis of excessive saving and 
wealth accumulation by elderly Japanese households.
How to alleviate the public pension uncertainty of elderly households effectively, however, remains an 
open question. Major possible reasons for public pension uncertainty include (a) nationals’ 
distrustfulness toward the pension system management (e.g. missing pension records, poor management 
of the pension fund), (b) anxiety about the sustainability of the public pension system because of 
population aging, and (c) irrational panic and gossip because of nationals’ lack of knowledge concerning 
the complicated public pension system and pension reforms. Therefore, effective strategies for easing 
pension uncertainty could be to provide a reliable, easy-to-understand reform plan to nationals and to 
improve the transparency and effi ciency of the pension management system.
Although encouraging dissaving by elderly households or encouraging inter vivos transfers is a 
potentially effi cient antirecession approach, there are some side-effects that we should consider. A large 
decline in elderly households’ wealth holdings is likely to weaken the domestic affordability of 
government bonds and then drive up the long-term interest rate. A dramatic rise in the interest rate will 
not only have a negative impact on the economy by crowding out equipment investment of private 
companies but also drive up the interest rate burden of government debt. To avoid debt default, the 
government would have to print more money, which may cause hyperinfl ation, raise tax rates, which will 
be harmful to economic growth, or cut public spending, which is extremely painful and politically 
diffi cult. In sum, expecting elderly households to spend more to save the Japanese economy has limited 
effectiveness.
An important limitation of our approach is that the subjective proxies for public pension uncertainty 
we used may suffer from endogeneity. Because we could not control households’ risk aversion and time 
preference rates because of lack of information, estimates of uncertainty may be upward biased if these 
two unobservable preference variables affect both households’ subjective uncertainty perceptions and 
wealth accumulation.
242
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We use the predicted labor income of the head-of-household from his/her income function as a proxy 
for his/her permanent income. This income function uses explanatory variables such as age, tenure, 
education, health condition, marriage status, occupation, industry, scale of workplace, size of city of 
residence, and district of residence. We also include the square of the person?s age and tenure as 
explanatory variables to measure age or tenure based upon an inverted-U earning profi le. A typical 
Mincerian wage function is employed, in which the dependent variable is the log of annual labor income. 
The estimation result is outlined in Table A.1.
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The government?s planned pension benefi t change is simulated by estimating the extent to which 
lifetime pension benefi ts will decline within the system of macroeconomic slide (MES) functions. We 
use the standard scenario used by the government in 2007, which assumed the following conditions???.
Nominal wage increase rate per year (w): 2.1 percent
14? Source: MHLW Pension Bureau ?A Simulation of Impact on Pension Finance by the 2004 Reform?. URL: http://
www.mhlw.go.jp/topics/nenkin/zaisei/zaisei/04/index.html
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Infl ation rate per year (π): 1.0 percent
Nominal interest rate (r): 3.2 percent
MES rate per year (k): 0.9 percent
Because it is planned that the MES be functioning between 2009 and 2023, we assume that pension 
benefi ts in other years are unchanged.  Then for people aged 55 in the JILPT 2009 survey, for instance, 
the MES will be applicable after they reach 65 years of age (2019) and end when they reach 69 years of 
age (2023). For people aged 65, however, the applicable period will be the longest (14 years). The 
pension benefi t for people aged 55, for instance, in 2023 (while MES applies) will be as follows (where 
the pension benefi t of people aged 69 in 2009=100):
?
???w?π?k?
?????PBMES
???????
???r?π????????????
? (3)
We assume that each person lives until age 85, and we sum up their lifetime public pension benefi t 
and compare it with the level when MES is absent to obtain the percentage change in the government 
planned public pension.  We then multiply this percentage with the ideal retirement pension benefi t 
obtained in the survey to get the value change in the government planned public pension. These two 
variables are employed to estimate the ratio of precautionary saving to total household wealth.
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